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We estimate the effect of several Supreme Court rulings during 2011 and 2012 that reduced 
the punishment for serious drug crime. We evaluate whether a decrease in punishment for 
serious drug crime had an impact on the aggregate crime rates and clear-up rates for seven 
other crime types. Those are the following; Assault, robbery/theft, theft of car, theft out of 
car, burglary, minor- and production drug offences. Our findings suggest that crime rates 
decreased for all property crime types and increased for drug crime following the Supreme 
Court rulings. In addition we find evidence that the clear-up rate increased for property crime 
offences while no significant change can be observed for drug crime. Regarding assault crime- 
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Drug policy is heavily debated in most countries of the world with various policy approaches 
ranging from legalization to heavy regulation with long time prison sentences, or even death 
penalty1. In some countries like Portugal and the Netherlands the possession and use of drugs 
is either decriminalized or only yield mild punishment such as a fine. Whereas in countries like 
the US and Sweden a large part of the prison population, 46,3- and 26 percent respectively is 
made up of drug offenders, (Federal Bureau of Prisons 2017, Kriminalvården, 2016). Both the 
mild and the harsh policy approach have been criticized either for dealing with drug abuse too 
lightly, allowing citizens to damage their health or because of the vast cost that follows with 
large amounts of incarceration along with the cost for police hours and criminal justice system, 
(Glaeser & Shleifer, 2001, Becker et al, 2006). Learning more about criminal behaviour is 
beneficial for society since the cost for it is very high, an estimated $179 billion in government 
expenditure annually in the USA (McCollister, 2010). The cost of crime is paid for collectively 
by mutual tax means in order to maintain a working court system and law enforcement.  
 
Our objective with this thesis is to evaluate what effect a sharp decrease in punishment for 
serious drug crime (§1 narkotikastrafflagen) had on crime rates as well as clear-up rates. We 
look at serious drug crime and the following seven crime types: assault, car theft, theft out 
of car, robbery, burglary, minor- and production drug crime. The data on drug crime when 
reported from the Swedish crime statistics bureau, Bottsförebygganderådet (BRÅ), is 
categorized as own consumption-, dealing- and production offences. This categorization differs 
from the court definition that instead categorize offences as “minor”, “normal” and “serious”. 
The majority of minor drug crimes consist of possession for own consumption offences while 
the majority of serious drug crimes are dealing offences. Most people getting convicted for 
serious drug crime have dealt narcotics, whereas far from every dealer getting caught gets a 
“serious” conviction. So forth the majority of serious drug crime convictions constitutes of 
dealing offences, (BRÅ). Production offences are mostly considered serious by the court but 
are however rare why we choose not to give them too much attention in this thesis.  
Assault is defined as assaults without deadly outcome. Robbery is defined as the aggregate of 
robbery and thefts, hence all kinds of robberies both against a person such as pickpocketing for 
example or property, such as store hold-ups.  
                                               
1  Several countries mainly in Asia and the Middle East execute death penalty for drug trafficking. (The Economist, 2015)   
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The sharp decrease in punishment came from a verdict from the Supreme Court in June 2011 
(NJA 2011 s. 357). This verdict became a new praxis and was followed by thirteen similar 
verdicts in 2012 (Maukku, 2012). In accordance with earlier findings in the literature on the 
subject and the rational model of crime, both discussed in extent below, our hypothesis is that 
when the punishment for drug crime is decreased the offence rate increases while property 
crime rates decrease. Regarding the effect on the number of cleared offences what to hypothesis 
is unclear. If the aggregate crime rate decrease then the clear-up rate could increase since there 
are fewer crimes for the police to investigate. If however there is need for a reallocation of 
police resources due to the increased workload following the Supreme Court ruling then it is 
instead possible that the clear-up rate decreases.    
 
The plausible relationship between drug use and criminality has been widely examined during 
a relatively long period of time and in numerous different countries. Pacula and Kilmer (2003) 
declare that numerous reports from Europe, USA and Australia all show consistent results that 
drugs in general and marijuana in particular is more a rule than an exception when arrestees 
are tested. The causality, however, that drug use causes crime is still very much under debate. 
Miron and Swiebel (1995) make the convincing argument that it is the fact that drug use is 
prohibited that drives the relationship between drug use and criminality. Because the lack of a 
legal or juridical alternatives in a prohibited market there are increased incentives to use 
violence to resolve disputes. Competing parties, such as “rival gangs”, lack incentives to 
include law enforcement in their affairs why they instead turn to violence. This might increase 
violent offences in society. Furthermore, Miron and Swiebel argue that the existence of cartels, 
increased accidental drug overdoses and increased property crime levels are all effects of the 
prohibition itself and would disappear with a ` free market´ for drugs. As it did when the alcohol 
prohibition ended in the USA in 1933 (Miron & Swiebel, 1995). Almost two decades later, 
following numerous policies and decriminalization acts, natural experiments appeared that 
made it possible to statistically evaluate what effect decriminalization drug policies had on 
crime rates. Discussed in more detail in the following chapter, these natural experiments found 
evidence of decreasing crime rates for property crime following the decriminalization of illicit 
drugs.  
In Sweden drugs are still illegal although there have been interesting changes in the severity of 
punishment for various drug crime. Our contribution to this debate is to evaluate whether a 
decrease in punishment for serious drug crime has an effect on crime rates for property and 
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violent crimes. To our knowledge there exists no previous research on this specific topic in 
Sweden. Our research plausibly provides suggestions into what real changes different laws and 
policies may generate. Our research approach is collecting monthly data on offence rates from 
the Swedish statistical crime bureau, BRÅ, for eight different crime types in all 21 of the 
Swedish counties. After collecting this data we constructed a panel data set from January 1995 
until December 2014. Using fixed effects and controlling for county specific demographics we 
estimate the effect of the Supreme Court rulings by measuring the offence rates before and after 
the first verdict in June 2011. In addition we construct a similar panel data set with yearly 
regional observations for clear-up rates as measured by total number of solved crimes divided 
by total reported crimes for each of the eight crime types. Once again we deploy fixed effects 
and county specific demographics to evaluate if the Supreme Court ruling and the changes in 
crime rates had an effect on police effectiveness. The ruling could alternatively result in law 
enforcement resources reallocation towards difference crime types.  
 
Finally, using a standard difference-in-differences research design, we evaluate whether the 
Supreme Court rulings had an effect on serious drug crime offences relative to minor drug 
offences. We have chosen to specify serious drug crime as dealing offences and minor drug 
crime as possession for own consumption. By doing so the two crime types get highly 
correlated since drug trade consist of a dealing and a buying part. The Supreme Court rulings 
only lowered the sentencing length for serious drug crime while the punishment for minor drug 
crime remained constant. Furthermore the two crime types have similar pre-treatment trends 
why the difference-in-difference research design is appropriate.  
 
We find that total crime rates decreased by between 28 and 46 percent following the Supreme 
Court rulings relative to before the verdicts. The largest decrease regards property offences and 
it is this decrease that drives the total crime rates down. Regarding drug crime we find that both 
minor and serious drug offences increase after the Supreme Court ruling. With regard to clear-
up rates we find increasing levels for property crime clear-ups, which is a natural effect from 
lower crime rates. Since police resources are fixed in the short run and there are fewer reported 
crimes to investigate an increase in clear-up rates should arguably be interpreted as a decreased 
workload for the law enforcement officers rather than an increase in effectiveness. Lastly we 
find that serious drug offences increase following the Supreme Court rulings relative to minor 
drug offences. This effects is expected since the Supreme Court ruling only regarded serious 
drug crime.  
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The thesis is organized as follows. Section 2a consists of a literature review where we present 
earlier research and findings on the subject. In section 2b background to the Supreme Court 
rulings and history of the drug politics in Sweden are presented. In section 3 economic theory 
and hypotheses are presented where focus lies on the Becker model of crime. Section 4 presents 
the data and methodology that we have used along with our regressions. Section 5 consists of 
analysis and results. Finally section 6 summarizes with a discussion and conclusion. 
 
2. Literature review & Institutional Background 
2a. Literature review  
Much of the previous research on the subject of illicit drugs and its role in crime and society 
has been made in other fields than economics. Researchers active in fields such as law, 
medicine, criminology and sociology would be interested in the legal, medical and criminal 
effects of illicit drugs. The research used in this thesis however, have an economic approach. 
The Becker model of crime is fundamental in the studies of the economics of crime and broadly 
used by researchers.   
 
The general findings on the subject of illicit drugs and crime is that in the case of a 
decriminalization or legalization policy, crime rates for non-drug crime often decreases or 
experiences no real change at all.  Gavrilova, Kamada and Zoutman (2014) found that violent 
crime rates decreased following the introduction of medical marijuana laws in the US states 
that border Mexico. Huber, Newman and LaFave (2015) find evidence that legalizing policies 
tend to decrease crime rates whereas decriminalization policies tend to have no effect or an 
increasing effect on crime rates. Discussed in more detail below are three studies that have 
been of special interest for us while working with this thesis.  
 
Benson et al. (1992) studied whether property crime is caused by drug use or that it is drug 
enforcement policy itself that drives property crime. By using data on arrests the authors proxy 
police resource allocation in order to investigate if there exist a correlation between the number 
of drug arrests and the amount of property crime. At the same time as the number of drug 
arrests and thereby police resources allocated towards drug crime increased there was also an 
increase in property crimes. If more resources are devoted to drug crimes this would mean that 
the risk of getting caught increases hence the number of crimes should decrease. So forth 
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property crime should decrease as well if the same criminals were committing these crimes. 
Instead the authors found that they increased as well. These results indicate that when more 
resources are being allocated to fighting drugs there are less police resources investigating 
property crimes. This then leads to a smaller risk of getting caught for property crime and it 
becomes more attractive.  
 
The authors employed a structural model that takes the size of the drug market into account 
when investigating the supply of property crime and the demand for police resources. By using 
data from several Florida counties in their model Benson et al. are able to conclude three things 
regarding property crime and drug enforcement policies. Drug enforcement policies do appear 
to cause property crime, the population of drug offenders is not equal to the population of 
property crime offenders. For about 15-25% of the drug using population drug use may cause 
property crime (Benson et al 1992). From these findings the authors argue that the correlation 
between drug use and property crime does not imply causation. The fact that most property 
criminals use drugs does not prove that most drug users commit property crime and it is 
possible that the correlation between drug use and crime might disappear with legalization of 
illicit drugs (Benson et al 1992). 
 
Further research on crime and illicit drugs have been made by Jerome Adda, Brendon 
McConell and Imran Rasul (2014) who studied a policing experiment in London during 2001. 
During a period of 18 months the possession of cannabis was no longer a punishable offence 
in one London borough, Lambeth. After the experiment the possession of cannabis was once 
again a punishable offence. This temporary policy change had various effects on non-drug and 
drug crime rates in the borough of Lambeth which Adda et al (2014) evaluate in their study. 
The authors performed a differences- in-difference research design and found that six months 
after the policy was taken into effect crime rates started decreasing for several non-drug crimes. 
The authors were able to pin down the reason for the effect to a shift in law enforcement 
resources from drug crime to property crime. The policing experiment from Lambeth indicates 
that when drug crime is deprioritized and thereby freeing up police resources to focus on other, 
non-drug crime, then crime rates for these crimes will decrease. 
 
Braakman and Jones (2004) study the effect of lowered expected punishment for cannabis 
possession following a declassification act in the UK. The authors use individual panel data to 
evaluate the effect of the policy change on both drug use and crime. Braakman and Jones (2004) 
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find no evidence that decreased expected punishment should increase drug use, crime or other 
risky behavior.  
       
With these studies in mind and following the reasoning of the Becker rational model of crime 
our aim is to investigate if decreasing crime rates following an expected punishment reduction 
is observable in Sweden. Our contribution to the debate is to evaluate whether there is an effect 
on crime rates for non-drug crime due to a policy change towards a decrease in punishment for 
drug crime.  
      
2b. Background 
Since the 1960's drug abuse has been considered a social problem in Sweden and in 1968 the 
current drug law was legislated. The law regulates possession, dealing, production and own 
consumption (BRÅ 2012). There was a crucial change in the current drug law in 1988 when 
the use itself got criminalized. Shortly after, 1993, a new law was enacted2 which included 
prison for a maximum of six months as imposed penalty for the crime of possession of narcotics 
for own consumption. Figure 1 provides an overview to the total drug crime development in 
Sweden between the years 1986 to 2014.  
 
Ever since 1986 drug crime have had a constant positive time trend in Sweden. During recent 
years the police have put in higher efforts to conquer the “own possession” drug crimes. Some 
of the increase in reported offences can be explained by this change in police routines. Since it 
is mostly the police who report drug offences it is natural that more efforts made by them leads 
to an increase in the statistics of minor drug offences. The number of drug convictions as a 












                                               






Note: Figure shows total drug crime sentences in Sweden from 1986 until 2014. The vertical line in 1993 indicates the year of the new law, 
which increased punishment for minor drug crime. The vertical line in 2012 indicates the time for the new praxis, which lowered punishment 
severity for serious drug crime. 
 
 
In Sweden the police powers depend on how severe punishments are associated with the crime. 
Thus the increase in punishment also lead to increased police powers (BRÅ, 2000). The main 
purpose of the increase in the severity of punishment for own consumption drug crime was to 
give the police powers to disrupt juvenile drug habits at an early stage. Furthermore, the law 
change made it possible to offer treatment for drug addiction to the offender (BRÅ 2012). 
However, following the law amendment in 1993, drug use arose with 40% during the five 
following years relative to the five years prior to 1993 (BRÅ 2012). With an increase in police 
powers the number of drug-tests taken where there was suspicion of illegal drug use, doubled 
in the same five following years. 90 percent of the drug tests executed by the police were 
positive. An increasing part of the arrests consists of minor drug crime, such as possession for 
own consumption (BRÅ 2000).  
 
During the 90's and until 2011 the law enforcement officers had high demands from bosses to 
catch a certain amount of offenders. In other words the police could in practice just pick up a 
known previous offender who they knew would test positive and thereby increase their 
statistics. This is why this sort of behaviour within the police department have earned the name 
“pinnjakt” meaning that law enforcement officers arrest and book known drug addicts in order 
to fulfill their quota and appear as an efficient department. This phenomenon seems to have re-
appeared since the police reform in 2015 (SvD, 2017).  In 2002 one third of the sentenced drug 
offenders was 30 years or older and had priorly been sentenced three or more times for any 
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crime. This indicates that law enforcement officers focused their arrests on known drug abusers 
in order to increase arrest rates rather than deterring total drug abuse (BRÅ 2000).  
 
In June 2011 the Supreme Court effectively lowered the sentence length of a serious drug 
crime3. This has later been described as a revolutionary event in the history of drug crime in 
Sweden (Maukku, 2012). The new praxis prompted thirteen similar rulings from the Supreme 
Court during 2012, which led to a new standard in serious drug crime verdicts. Before the 2011 
ruling, the focus of the assessment of the crime was put on the amount of narcotics that had 
been handled and not much attention was given to the circumstances surrounding the crime. 
Following the ruling, the Supreme Court established that circumstances should have greater 
importance in deciding whether a drug crime were to yield a “serious” verdict or not (Maukku, 
2012). Circumstances include, if the business was profitable, well organized or whether it 
aimed its sales towards youths. After the praxis 2011-2012 these kinds of circumstances are 
given more attention. In practice the same amount of drugs that would be considered a serious 
drug crime, yielding a long prison sentence before the praxis 2011-2012 could after the praxis 
be diminished to drug crime of the normal degree with shortening of the prison sentence to half 
of the prior length. The praxis change resulted in fewer sentences for drug crime of the serious 















                                               




Note: The figure shows number of serious drug sentences between 1995 and 2014. The vertical line indicates the starting point 
of the praxis. 
 
The Supreme Court argued that the new praxis was more in line with the original purpose of 
the legislation as intended by the legislator, thus meaning that the law itself was not the problem 
but the courts practice of it.  
 
After the Supreme Court rulings serious drug crime received a higher evidential burden. Law 
enforcement officers now had to provide not only a certain amount of narcotics but also proof 
of sales, to what customer sales had aimed and potential economic gain the perpetrator 
benefited. This led to an increase in police hours in order to investigate serious drug crime 
following the 2011/2012 praxis (BRÅ, 2013). To get a perspective from within the police force 
on how the policy change affected their working routines, we conducted interviews with law 
enforcement officers in Stockholm, Skåne and Västra Götaland4. Officers from all three regions 
share the same view, that the new policy made it harder to convict drug crime offenders, since 
more police hours were required in order to have enough evidence for the court to convict. To 
achieve a verdict of the same extent as before, the documentation of the suspects criminal 
business would after the verdict have had to be more extensive. The focus of the police work 
also changed. Before the target was to catch as many drug users as possible, but with more 
restrictions and the need of higher suspicions the police had to spend more hours in order to 
                                               
4 Information from telephone interviews with officer Per Karlsson, Polisen Stockholm, officer Ola Hornmark, Polisen Syd and polisen Väst.  
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have enough evidence for the prosecutor to classify the crime as a drug offence of the serious 
degree. The police claimed that this thorough work would more often lead to an arrest of a 
criminal gang through for example, wire-tapping, and that this possibly could lead to more 
people being arrested in the same swop instead of just the dealers on the street.  
 
3. Economic theory & Hypotheses  
The Becker model of crime argues that there is an optimal level of police enforcement, and this 
level depends on the cost of catching and convicting offenders. (Becker, 1968)  
The model argues that every individual has a personal utility function and a linear payoff to 
punishment function. If the person's utility for engaging in criminal activity exceeds the utility 
for making a living with legal earnings the model states that the person will indeed commit 
criminal acts. Hence the model assumes rational individuals that make a choice between 
criminal and legal activity based on the expected utility of both. This choice is made under 
uncertainty since the probability of being caught when committing a crime is of course 
uncertain.  
 
3.1 Mathematical characteristics - Becker Rational model of crime 
According to the Becker model of crime the expected utility (EU) from crime is: 
 
𝐸𝑈 = (1 − 𝑝). 𝑈(𝑊𝑐) − 𝑝. 𝑈(𝑆) 
 
Abbreviations used in the equations are the following. 𝑊𝑐 is the monetary gain from 
committing an offence. S is the sanction for being caught and p is the probability of being 
caught. If legal wages are W, then an individual will commit a crime if the utility of legal 
earnings is smaller than the utility of criminal activity. Shown mathematically below.  
 
(1 − 𝑝). 𝑈(𝑊𝑐) − 𝑝 > 𝑈(𝑊) 
 
These equations imply that (1) Crime needs to pay more than working. 
As p rises the gap (WC − W) also increase because there is a higher chance of being caught. 
The model also reveals how crime participation depends on individual characteristics for 
example earnings W, education E, age and gender as well as characteristics of the criminal 
justice system like police or sentence length (Machin, 2017). (2) Utility is individual. 
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Meaning, for the same risk of getting caught, the utility of crime might be worth the cost of 
getting caught for one individual, but not for another. Whether crime pays off becomes a 
calculation of the person's willingness to take risk. Risk however is the risk to get caught, which 
normally should increase with more police resources. It could also decrease with other types 
of cautions say, good lawyers, (Becker, 1968).  
 
Getting arrested for committing a crime is not certain, only a risk. The reporting rate on drug 
crime depends mostly on how much drugs are around and on the police's priorities and efforts 
(BRÅ 2000). This is reasonable because with drug crime no one except for the police have an 
incentive to report the crime. Both buying and selling drugs is illegal in Sweden so neither 
buyer nor seller has an incentive to report. So forth the probability of getting caught affects 
criminals’ incentives, their cost, of committing crime. Benson et al (1992) argue that this is 
why drug dealing and other criminal activity can be very common and visible in some city parts 
but not in others. Criminal activity is not visible in some areas because the risk of getting 
caught, either from law enforcement officers or seen by witnesses, is higher than the gain. 
There is a lot of evidence supporting the negative relationship between the probability of arrest 
and the level of crime, all other things equal (Benson et al 1992). This would be in line with 
Beckers argument of people making a cost- benefit calculation before committing crime.  
 
3.2 Hypotheses section 
Following the reasoning of the Becker rational model of crime and earlier findings from 
research on the subject we hypothesize that following the Supreme Court rulings, offence rates 
for drug crime of the serious degree should increase. The Supreme Court rulings in 2011-2012 
decreased punishment for serious drug crime. When the expected punishment for a crime is 
decreased there is an increased incentive for individuals at the margin to commit that crime, 
why it is plausible that drug offences of the serious degree increases following the Supreme 
Court ruling.  
 
After interviews with officers from the police departments of region Stockholm, Syd and Väst 
and from reports from BRÅ we have learnt that more police working hours have to be put into 
investigating each drug crime after the Supreme Court ruling. The increased time spent on each 
drug crime could either be seen in our results as a decreased clear-up rate for drug offences of 
the serious degree or, if resources are reallocated within the police as decreased clear-up rates 
for non-drug crime. However, if the decreased punishment for drug crime has a similar 
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decreasing effect on aggregate crime rates as it had in the UK (Adda et al 2004) and the US 
(Gavrilova et al 2014) then it is instead possible that clear-up rates increase for non-drug crime 
in Sweden as well. If reported crime decreases and solved crime is constant then the clear-up 
ratio will increase even though the same amount of crimes are solved.  
 
4. Data & Methodology  
4.1 Data 
Data has been collected from the Swedish statistical crime bureau, Brottsförebygganderådet, 
database. Monthly data on crime rates for all eight crime types from the year 1995 until 2014 
from all 21 Swedish counties. Statistics on crime rates were collected for property crime 
including; burglary, robbery, car theft and theft out of car and statistics of reported drug 
offences, sorted as minor, serious and production offences. Minor drug offences are made up 
of possession and own consumption offences. Serious drug crime is dealing offences. BRÅ 
reports drug crime in their statistics as possession-, dealing- and production offences without 
specifying whether the offences are dealt with in court as a serious or minor drug crime. 
Because of this we have chosen to use the variables “serious” as proxy for dealing offences and 
“production” as a proxy for production offences. Most of the offences that are treated as serious 
in court are dealing offences and hence reported as “serious” from BRÅ.  
 
All the data was summed on a excel sheet categorized by time, year , month, region and crime 
type. The dependent variable in our first equation (1) is Crime rate, which would be impossible 
to measure since not all crime is reported. Instead we proxy for the actual crime rate, using the 
reported number of crime in each county for each crime type during a certain time period. It is 
important to acknowledge here that the reported crime rate varies for different crime types and 
is in extent a good measure regarding some crime types and a lesser good measure regarding 
other. The reported amount of property crime is to be considered a good proxy since an 
individual in Sweden is required to present a police report in order to collect insurance. This is 
why it can be assumed that most property crime is reported. For assault on the other hand, while 
not being prioritized in this thesis, the reported crime rate is a crude measure of the actual crime 
rate. Since we have decided to use aggregate data on non-fatal outcome assault the estimated 
number of unknown cases is expected to be large. BRÅ concludes that the actual amount of 
assault is approximately four times the reported amount (BRÅ 2006). Drug offences are as 
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stated above the number of reported offences by the police why the actual crime rate is 
plausibly larger.  
 
4.2 Empirical Strategy  
In order to evaluate the effect on crime rates of the 2011-2012 Supreme Court rulings we use 
both a before-and-after and a difference-in-differences research design.  
 
4.2.1 Criminal behaviour 
To evaluate whether there is a causal impact of the 2011-2012 Supreme Court ruling on 
property- and violent crime rates we estimate the following panel data specification.  
 
𝑙𝑛(𝐶)𝑐𝑚𝑦 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑐𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑐𝑚𝑦 + 𝛼𝑐 + 𝛼𝑦 + 𝛼𝑚 + 𝜀𝑐𝑚𝑦   (1) 
 
Where 𝑙𝑛(𝐶)𝑐𝑚𝑦 is the total number of reported offences of a given crime type in a specific 
county during a specific month and year. 𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑐𝑚𝑦 is a dummy taking the value of 1 after the 
first Supreme Court ruling 2011 that initiated the decreasing sentencing length for drug crime. 
This ruling was then followed by several similar verdicts. Thus, 𝛽
1
measures the effect on crime 
rates that the Supreme Court ruling and its aftermath had. 𝑋𝑐𝑚𝑦 contain the following controls; 
rate of male unemployment and county demographics. This controls for amount of population 
that is male and aged 15-24, 25-34, 35-44 and 45-54. 𝛼𝑐 represent county fixed effects that 
control for persistent differences across countries. 𝛼𝑦 is year fixed effects that control for 
national time trends that are equal across counties and 𝛼𝑚 denotes monthly fixed effects that 
control for the seasonality of crime. We include fixed effects in our estimation in order to 
control for the unobserved heterogeneity in our model. Since the expected severity of 
punishment for serious drug crime decreases we would expect drug offences of the serious 
degree to increase. In other words we expect 𝛽1 >  0.  
 
4.2.2 Effective allocation of police resources?   
We evaluate equation (2) in order to investigate if the Supreme Court ruling in 2011 and the 
following rulings in 2012 had an effect on the allocation of police resources between various 
crimes. From interviews with high ranking police officers in Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö5 
                                               
5 Information from telephone interviews with officer Per Karlsson, Polisen Stockholm, officer Ola Hornmark, Polisen Syd and polisen Väst. 
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we have learnt that following the Supreme Court verdicts the police were required to spend 
more investigating and working hours per drug crime. 
 
𝑙𝑛(𝐶𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑟 − 𝑢𝑝)𝑐𝑦 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑐𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑐𝑦 + 𝛼𝑐 + 𝛼𝑦 + 𝜀𝑐𝑦  (2) 
  
 
Clear up is total amount of cleared crimes of a given crime type divided by total amount of 
reported crime in a specific county during a certain year. 𝐻𝐻𝐻is once again a dummy taking 
the value of one after the first Supreme Court ruling in 2011 and zero otherwise. We apply the 
same controls as in equation (1) and use the same fixed effects as earlier. The data on clear-up 
rates when reported from BRÅ is on yearly level why equation (2) is subject to far less 
observations than equation (1) and is thereby lacking monthly fixed effects. If we find that 
crime rates decreases following the 2011-2012 Supreme Court rulings, we would expect the 
clear up rates to increase. If there are fewer crimes to investigate, the police would be able to 
spend more time and resources on each crime, and hence we expect clear-up rates to increase. 
If crime rates would increase following the ruling, plausibly clear-up rates would decrease due 
to an increased workload.    
   
4.2.3 Effect of Supreme Court ruling on serious and minor drug offences 
Lastly we estimate the impact of the 2011-2012 Supreme Court rulings on serious drug offences 
relative to minor drug offences. The two offences are correlated since the majority of the minor 
offences are possession for own consumption and the majority of the serious drug crimes are 
dealing offences. Naturally these two offences are dependent on each other and one of them 
would not exist without the other. In figure 4 we show the trends for both offences and the red 
lines indicates the period of the 2011-2012 Supreme Court rulings that lowered the expected 
punishment for serious offences. In other words serious drug offences are treated while the 
expected punishment for minor drug offences is unchanged, making this offence our control 
offence. When we limit the sample size to run from 2000 until 2014 it is further possible to 
argue that the two crime types have similar pre-treatment trends, as seen in figure 4. We split 
up the effect of the Supreme Court rulings since it seems, from observing figure 4, that serious 
offences increased in a more rapid pace directly after the first verdict. The increase then flats 
out during 2012. The separation is done in order to observe the effect of the praxis change on 
serious drug crime directly after the first verdict and after the following verdicts in 2012. 
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Presented below is the panel data specification for minor and serious drug offences estimated 
using a standard difference-in-difference research design.  
 
𝑙𝑛(𝐶)𝑐𝑚𝑦 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡1 + 𝛽2 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2 + 𝛽3𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡1 ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) +
𝛽5(𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2 ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) + 𝛽6𝑋𝑐𝑚𝑦 + 𝛼𝑐 + 𝛼𝑦 + 𝛼𝑚 + 𝜀𝑐𝑚𝑦
 (3) 
 
(𝐶)𝑐𝑚𝑦 is the reported crime rate for serious drug offences. 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡1 is a dummy variable taking 
the value of one after the first verdict in June 2011 until the last of December 2011. 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2  is 
a dummy variable taking the value of one after the first of January 2012 until the last of  
December 2014. 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the crime is a drug 
crime of the serious degree. 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡1 ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 and 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2 ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 are interaction 
variables of the different dummy variables and the treatment. 𝛽
4
 and 𝛽5are so forth the 
coefficients of interest that estimate the differential change in serious drug offences relative to 
minor drug offences after the policy change. We use the same controls and fixed effects in all 
three equations. 
 
Figure 4.  
 
Note:Graph shows number of serious and minor offences from year 1995 until 2014. Number of serious offences 
are being shown at the right hand vertical axis and minor at the left hand vertical axis. The red lines indicate the 
period of the Supreme Court rulings, with the first one in June 2011 and thirteen more until December 2012 . Both 
crimes show similar trends from around year 2000 but moves in different direction after the Supreme Court rulings 
 
Controls that are added to our equation are demographics of the male population and male 
unemployment. We add controls in order to eliminate part of the omitted variable bias. It is 
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reasonable to only add the male population since men stand for the vast majority of the crimes 
examined. Men stand for 93 percent of the car thefts, 92 percent of the burglaries, 64 percent 
of “other theft”, 87 percent of assault offences and 85 percent of the narcotics offences (BRÅ 
2007). Controls are expected to be both correlated to the dependent variable and the 
independent variable.  
 
Male demographics is controlled for to make sure an observed change in crime rate, not only 
comes from a larger male population, which naturally would drive up the crime rate but from 
changes because of the policy change.  
 
As further robustness checks we limit the sample size to run between both 2000 until 2014 and 
2005 until 2014 in order to make our results robust to potential trends early in the sample period 
that would otherwise drive the effect of the Supreme Court ruling in a plausibly unwanted and 
untrue direction.  
 
We have chosen to include equation (3) because of the threats of internal validity of the before-
and-after design. Because our sample period is relatively long, even after limiting it, we can’t 
be sure that other circumstance except the Supreme Court ruling affects our estimates. Since 
both minor and serious drug crime show similar pre-treatment trends before the praxis, we use 
the difference-in-difference design (DiD) to only bring out the change in criminal behavior that 
is causal to the Supreme Court praxis. In other words the effect that we can observe with the 
















In the first column the effect on total crime rates are shown. At the baseline, row 1, a decrease 
by 28.2 percent is observed after the first Supreme Court ruling in June 2011. The baseline 
results however is likely to be subject to large omitted variable bias and when we include time, 
county and month fixed effects to the equation, row 2, the magnitude of the effect increase to 
-35.1 percent. The fixed effects control for differences across counties over time, national time 
trends and the seasonality of crime respectively and thereby amount for a part of the earlier 
omitted variable bias. Our results suggests that after the policy change there is at least a 35.1 
percent decrease in total reported crime rate relative to before the Supreme Court ruling. Our 
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results are robust to additionally controlling for socio-demographic properties of the counties. 
When applying a full set of controls to the equation and limiting the sample period to run 
between 2005 until 2014 the estimated effect of the Supreme Court ruling increases to -46.9 
percent and this measure is arguably the most accurate of the above since limiting the sample 
size cancels out potential earlier trends that plausibly drive the effect of the Supreme Court 
ruling. However, for all crime types the effect on our estimates from limiting the sample size 
is relatively small, showing that our results are robust.  
 
All property crime types, column 3-6, show significant negative effects of the Supreme Court 
ruling on offence rates. This indicates that property offences in total have been decreasing since 
2011 and are driving the total crime rates down. The largest decrease in crime rates are shown 
for crimes against motor vehicles. Both theft out of car and car theft show large significant and 
negative effects on crime rates after the 2011 Supreme Court ruling. However, the effect is not 
for certain a result of the decreased punishment regarding drug crime.  It is possibly partially a 
result of technical improvements. The security and alarm systems on modern vehicles have 
rapidly increased since the 1990´s making car theft a more advanced crime than earlier. This 
could be one reason to why crime rates regarding car theft and theft out of car decreased after 
the praxis. There are multiple possible reasons for why property crime rates are decreasing after 
the 2011 Supreme Court ruling that have no relation to the verdict itself. Reasons ranging from 
anti-theft campaigns to police reprioritizing could very well be alternative explanations.  
 
Assault offences increased after the policy change with between 20.9 and 43.9 percent. It is 
possibly correlated with the increase in drug offences (See table 2). Because of the fact that 
drugs are illegal there are no court system to use when help is needed to solve disputes. Instead 
violence is often used between individuals or cartels (Miron and Swiebel 1995). It is plausible 
that more drugs around might increase and encourage this kind of violence. The increase in 
assault offence is plausibly an effect of drugs nature to affect people's mind and consequence 
thinking (National Institute on Drug Abuse). Our findings suggest that if drug use increases 
there is a possible correlation to an increase in assault rates. 
 
When the sample size is limited to run between 2005 until 2014 the coefficient on assault crime 
rates drops sharply and the effect of the Supreme Court ruling is close to zero. However, 
reported assault offences have increased during our sample period but in a more rapid pace 
during the latter part of our sample period. It is likely that this increase is what causes our 
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volatile assault results. Between 2005 and 2007 there was a spike in the number of assaults, 
mostly in public places, which was likely due to large number of youths and a positive 
economic cycle, which lead to more people engaging in nightlife and public entertainment 
activities (Granath 2012). Since the coefficient on assault is close to zero when we limit the 
sample size it is difficult to draw any conclusions. Just as with our results on property crime 
we can’t be sure that the change in assault crime rates are actually correlated to the 2011 






Regarding drug offences, as seen in table 2, all of the variables serious, production and minor 
show significant positive effects after the Supreme Court ruling. Regarding serious and 
production offences this is not surprising since the policy effectively lowered the expected 
punishment for these crime types. According to the Becker rational model of crime an expected 
effect of decreased punishment is increased crime rates for that specific crime. The magnitude 
of the coefficients vary when the sample period is shortened and full controls are added but 
never change sign and are statistically significant at the one percent level. Minor drug offences 
show a positive effect after the 2011 Supreme Court verdict. This effect is reasonable since 
serious, or dealing offences, stands for the supply, which are reliant on demand, which would 
be possession or minor offences. Another indication of this is that the increase in minor 
offences is of the same magnitude as the increase in serious offences. Our findings suggest a 



























Following the first Supreme Court ruling in 2011 the clear up rate increased by between 19.2% 
and 28.6% for crimes in total. The effect of the Supreme Court ruling on clear up rates is 
positive for all crime types except for assault where the results are mixed. Since the police 
authority claim not to have done any organizational changes it is plausible that the reason for 
the increase in clear up rates for all examined crimes, except assault is simply fewer reported 
crimes. If the police have the same resources as before but there is a decrease in number of 
crimes, this means that more resources can be put to each crime, which also should increase 
the clear up rate. The Clear-up rate for assault offences are small, change signs and are in some 
cases insignificant making it hard for us to draw any conclusions. We believe the “FE & 
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Controls 2005” row in the table are the most relevant since that specification include both fixed 





There is no significant change in clear-up rates for most of the drug crimes except for some 
that are marked in the table. Without significant values it is difficult to interpret the effect of 
the Supreme Court ruling on clear-up rates for drug offences. The offence rate for drug crime, 
table 2, showed large, positive and significant results that indicate large increase in crime after 
the 2011 praxis change. Since the reported crime rate for drug crime is from the police via 
arrest records most of the drug crime that is reported is also solved (BRÅ 2005). This might be 
a possible reason for our insignificant results regarding clear-up rates. If most reported drug 
crime still is solved by the police then neither a decrease nor increase in clear-up rates after the 




Table 5 shows the results from estimating equation (3). In post1 the policy dummy is equal to 
one after the first Supreme Court ruling in June 2011 and in post2 the policy dummy is equal 
to one from the beginning of 2012. Column 1 is the baseline results where we include no 
controls. In column 2, 3 and 4 however, we include the same controls and fixed effects as 
earlier. In column 3 we limit the sample size to run between 2000 and 2014 and in column 4 
between 2005 and 2014, as we have done the earlier specifications.  
 
 
In the first row the results shows the effect of the first Supreme Court ruling in June 2011 on 
drug offences of the serious degree. These results are in line with the earlier results from table 
1. The results indicate that drug offences of the serious degree increased after the policy. In the 
fourth row the results from the difference-in-difference using serious drug crime as treated after 
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the first Supreme Court verdict in June 2011 are presented. At baseline level there is a positive 
effect of 14.4 percent on drug offences of serious degree relative to drug offences of minor 
degree. When we include fixed effects and controls to our estimation the results become 
insignificant. However, when limiting the sample size to run from 2000 and 2005 until 2014 
respectively the effect is instead once again significant and positive indicating that offences of 
the serious degree increased with between 17.6 and 25.9 percent relative to minor offences 
after the Supreme Court ruling. We believe these results, column 3 and 4, to be the best 
prediction since the DiD research design assumes similar pre-treatment trends and this is true 
for our two crimes after the year 2000.  
 
In row 5 when the policy dummy takes the value of one after the first Supreme Court ruling in 
2012 the positive effect increases with between 15.3 and 36.1 as relative to minor offences 
depending on the sample size. This is in line with what we can read of graph 3. It seems that 
after the Supreme Court ruling drug offences of the serious degree increased more rapidly than 
minor offences. Only after 2013 it would seem that the police caught up with the intensified 
criminal behaviour and the number of offences decreased. From this it is plausible to believe 
that criminal individuals react faster to a change in expected punishment than the police are 
able to reorganize their operational method.  
 
6. Conclusion 
When looking at the effect of the Supreme Court rulings that decreased punishment for serious 
drug crime, in 2011-2012, the Becker model would predict crime rates to increase. This is 
because the cost, eg. the risk of getting caught, for committing a crime decreases and so forth 
the benefit of committing crime increases. This would mainly affect people at the margin to 
commit more serious drug crime.  
 
Our findings are in line with what the Becker model predicts. We found that serious drug crime 
increased as an effect of the new praxis with between 75 and 98%.  
So what about property crime? Our results suggest a decrease in actual crime rates and an 
increase in clear up rates, after the policy change. There seems to be some sort of positive 
correlation between property crime and a decrease in punishment for serious narcotics. This is 
also what earlier research on the subject has found. However, it is hard to conclude whether 
the increase in clear up rates was an effect of police reallocation towards investigating more 
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property crime, or if the clear up rate increased because of fewer property crimes to investigate. 
In the short run police resources are assumes to be fixed and we confirm from sources from the 
police departments that there has been no reallocation of labor within the police department.  
 
For assault it is hard to draw any conclusions since the number for the reported rates became 
diminishingly small when limiting the sample size, including the controls and fixed effects. 
Regarding the clear up rates for assault the results were not significant or robust. 
 
7. Discussion  
Our results point towards that a decrease in punishment would lead to an increase in that 
specific crime. Whether the same applies the other way around, hence that an increase in 
punishment would decrease crime rates is nothing we can conclude. However the Becker model 
would predict such a scenario (Becker 1968).  
 
Since the praxis change came into place because of ill interpretation of the original law, and 
not because of a sudden change in drug criminality, we do not believe our results to be subject 
to simultaneity. 
 
Regarding the exogeneity assumption we believe it to exist variables other than male 
demographics and male unemployment rate hidden in the error term. Earlier research from 
other countries than Sweden has estimated the size of the drug market, which we would have 
appreciated to control for. This however, we believe to be beyond the scope of our bachelor 
thesis why we haven’t included it. Estimating the size of an illegal market is difficult because 
of no official data and actors in the market have low incentives to share their sales statistics. 
Because of this we do not believe that we fulfill the exogeneity assumption in our before-and-
after estimation. Which is why we also estimate the difference-in-difference model that don’t 
make as strong assumptions.  
 
After the new praxis from the Supreme Court we can expect fewer serious drug crime 
convictions. This is because the Court requires the prosecutors to present more details of the 
circumstances surrounding the case in order to convict a suspect for drug crime of the serious 
degree. Sources from the police department confirm that they need to allocate more police 
hours and reconnaissance in order to provide enough evidence to the prosecutor for a serious 
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conviction. However, this thorough work is also expected to pay off as they can arrest gangs 
and not just single criminals that are often simply part of a large chain.  
 
For property crime, we can´t conclude that the decrease in property crime is an effect of the 
decrease in punishment for serious drug crime. If we would have evidence of the police shifting 
resources towards investigating more property crime, that would be a plausible reason to why 
clear up rates increase for all property crimes examined. As Adda et al (2014) found in their 
research it is plausible that a decrease in punishment for drug crime will make other crime rates 
decrease. That would be an effect of police having fixed resources and when they don´t have 
to spend time investigating one crime, they can instead shift resources and efforts towards 
solving another crime. Adda et al (2014) argued that the increase in clear up rates was an effect 
of police being able to solve more property crimes since they don´t have to be occupied clearing 
up drug crimes. This implies that the police can shift their resources from drug crime 
investigation to property crime investigation. In Sweden we have found no evidence of such a 
resource shift since narcotics-police in Sweden work only with narcotics and the same applies 
for the property crime investigators.  
 
There seems to be some effect that increased the number of assaults after the mitigation of 
punishment for serious drug crime. However this increase is very small in comparison to how 
much the other crimes decrease. It is questionable if there is an effect on assault at all, but if 
so, that effect seems to be a diminishingly small positive effect. Why assault would increase 
after the praxis change can have several other reasons than the policy change regarding drug 
crime itself. For further research we believe that it would be interesting to include shootings as 
a violent crime since it might be correlated to drug crime to a higher extent than assault 
offences.  
 
During our work with this thesis there have been multiple shootings across Sweden (SVT, 
2017) and those might be correlated to illegal drug markets. We think it would be a good idea 
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